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INTRODUCTION 
Modern civil rights policy is, as the late Justice Scalia warned, at 
“war.”1 On the one hand, some laws, like Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Fair Housing Act, can impose liability for 
decisions due to their racial impacts rather than their racial motivation.2 
Defendants in such cases can always respond that the challenged deci-
sion (a test, a criterion, an allocation) is necessary in some legally cog-
nizable sense;3 but the courthouse doors open with the prima facie case 
of disparate impact. On the other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, ever since the ascent of the “color-blind” over 
the “antisubordination” reading of the Amendment, subjects even benign 
discrimination—that designed to help minorities—to searching constitu-
                                                     
 Duke Law School. Thanks to Nita Farahany and Elisabeth deFontenay for discussing this project 
with me. 
 1. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 2. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507 (2015). 
 3. See id. at 2522–23. 
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tional scrutiny.4 As a result, race-conscious decisions intended to allevi-
ate disparate impacts under laws designed to enforce Equal Protection 
norms may themselves violate Equal Protection.5 The Court has yet to 
defuse the conflict. 
This Article offers some thoughts on how to subtly reframe the de-
bate by looking at the problem of disparate impacts as a Thirteenth 
Amendment issue, and not solely as a Fourteenth Amendment one.6 In 
this Article, I argue that modern systemic empathetic failures towards 
minorities, and those of African descent in particular, are legacies of an 
instrumentalist view of Black lives and Black labor. Once Blacks ceased 
to be useful as a source of property or service, there was a widespread 
desire to have them simply go away. These attitudes form an underap-
preciated historical “badge” or “relic” of slavery that Congress can ad-
dress through its Section Two enforcement power. Even in the absence 
of such legislation, race-conscious policies designed to address systemic 
empathy deficits towards minorities, understood as a “badge” or “relic” 
of slavery, form a compelling governmental interest. This compelling 
government interest need not be subject to the most restrictive race-
neutral and narrow-tailoring strictures of Equal Protection. The policies 
can be race-conscious because, unlike the commerce authority or the 
“colorblind” Equal Protection Clause, slavery was a race-conscious insti-
tution in America. One must be conscious of race to dismantle a race-
conscious institution. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the problem of 
modern disparate impact as arising from empathy deficits—the systemat-
ic inability of individuals to assess or to even “see” the pain of others, 
especially from certain racial and ethnic groups. Compared to the 1960s, 
disparate impacts in the twenty-first century are less likely the product of 
intentional overt discrimination.7 Instead, disparate impacts occur be-
cause persons who hold the levers of economic, social, and political 
power simply do not figure into their calculus the effects of their deci-
                                                     
 4. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkinization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286–87 (2011) (describing but casting doubt 
on this conventional account). 
 5. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (expressing concern that inadequate procedural 
safeguards in disparate impact cases will ineluctably lead to constitutionally suspect racial quotas). 
 6. For other treatments of disparate impact and the Thirteenth Amendment, see William M. 
Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slav-
ery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007), and Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-subordination 
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255 (2010). 
 7. See Justin D. Levinson, Introduction: Racial Disparities, Social Sciences, and the Legal 
System, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 1 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 
2012). 
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sions on certain populations.8 In a demonstrable psychological sense, 
they do not “feel the pain” of others.9 Aggregated over groups and com-
pounded over time, this empathy deficit can generate the kind of dispar-
ate impacts we observe today—whether we are talking about courtrooms, 
boardrooms, or classrooms. 
Part II relates this empirical and systemic concept of empathy defi-
cits with the history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Reconstruc-
tion Era.   Beginning with the Founding, but accelerating during Recon-
struction, the political consciousness of the American majority has al-
ways struggled with a deep desire for Blacks to simply vanish. This de-
sire to erase Blacks from public consciousness and political concern 
manifested itself literally—through the colonization movement—and 
metaphorically—through the belief that the invisible hand of the market 
would take care of the “Negro problem.”10 That America ratified the 
Thirteenth Amendment, coupled with a statutory and, soon after, consti-
tutional commitment to Black citizenship,11 stands as a historical repudi-
ation of the recurrent desire to wish away the whole matter of race, labor, 
and class. 
Part III of this Article highlights how disparate impact as a Thir-
teenth Amendment concern relates to legal doctrine. It discusses the 
Thirteenth Amendment power to legislate against “badges” and “relics” 
of slavery, and suggests that it, as opposed to the Commerce Clause, can 
serve as a stronger source of disparate impact authority in both a moral 
and legal sense, given the history in Part II. 
I. DISPARATE IMPACT HISTORY, TAXONOMY, AND ETIOLOGY 
Disparate impact is a theory that begins with Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.12 The Supreme Court in Griggs, construing Title VII, held that the 
statute prohibited facially neutral examinations that had the effect of dis-
                                                     
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Study of the Negro Problems, 11 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SCI. 1 
(1898), reprinted in 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 13, 18–19 (2000) (“[I]f a Southern 
white man writes on the subject he is apt to discuss problems of ignorance, crime and social degrada-
tion; and yet each calls the problem he discusses the Negro problem, leaving in the dark background 
the really crucial question as to the relative importance of the many problems involved.”). 
 11. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27-30, 27 (declaring “all persons born in the United 
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the state wherein they reside.”). 
 12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a summary of this history and the seeds of this taxonomy I relied 
upon Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious But Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact 
in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653 (2015). 
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advantaging minority candidates where there was no evidence that the 
exam was a business necessity.13 Although controversy remains about 
whether Griggs properly construed Title VII,14 Congress subsequently 
codified its holding, with modification, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.15 
Griggs was a case about statutory construction.16 The constitutional 
parameters of disparate impact, by contrast, took an agnostic, then re-
strictive turn. In Washington v. Davis17 and again in Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,18 the Court held that nothing in the 
judicially enforceable provisions of the Equal Protection Clause required 
a disparate impact theory of liability, although enforcement of Equal Pro-
tection norms, through disparate impact legislation, may be permitted.19 
Then, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Roberts Court suggested that disparate 
impact as a theory, to the extent it allows race-conscious decisionmaking 
(at least in the absence of documented past discrimination), may actually 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.20 Hence, the notion that Equal Pro-
tection is currently at “war” with itself.21 
Disparate impact theory addresses three legacies of our sordid his-
tory of race discrimination.22 The first is the intentional discriminator.  
Not the grotesque racial antagonist, but the cunning one: the one who 
understands that the old way is gone, that gratuitous racism usually 
“backfires,” but that “the byproduct” of apparently race-neutral mecha-
nisms will end up hurting one group more than another.23 Disparate im-
pact liability is aimed at “smoking out” these cunning intentional dis-
criminators.24 
                                                     
 13. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.  
 14. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2526 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We should drop the pretense that Griggs’ interpretation of 
Title VII was legitimate.”). 
 15. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 656. 
 16. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26. 
 17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 18. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 19. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 660–63. 
 20. Id. at 665–68. 
 21. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, The Origins of Arguments over Reverse Discrimination: 
Lessons from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in THE GREATEST AND GRANDEST ACT: THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO TODAY (Christian G. Samito ed.) (forthcoming 
2017). 
 22. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 657–58 (developing this taxonomy). 
 23. See MATTHEW W. HUGHEY & GREGORY S. PARKS, THE WRONGS OF THE RIGHT: 
LANGUAGE, RACE, AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 95 (2014) (quoting the 
remarks of the late Lee Atwater, former Republican strategist). 
 24. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing 
one view of disparate impact as “simply an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional 
discrimination—to ‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment”); see also Siegel, supra note 12, at 
657. 
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The second is the ignorant discriminator. This person has no con-
scious hostility towards a certain group, but because of implicit bias or 
other subconscious mechanisms, this person reveals discriminatory pref-
erences in his or her choices.25 The empirical and experimental evidence 
for this type of bias is substantial and increasing.26 Disparate impact the-
ory aimed at implicit bias is designed to encourage debiasing policies or, 
more problematically, to punish the unconscious offender.27 
The third is the institutional discriminator.28 Like the ignorant dis-
criminator, this person does not consciously make a discriminatory deci-
sion.  But unlike the ignorant discriminator, the decision need not be the 
product of individual implicit bias; it could be that the architecture for 
choice—“the known world” as it were29—does not permit any decision 
but the discriminatory one.30 The institutional discriminator, in the lan-
guage of Ian Haney López, is simply following a “script” or a “path” in 
which the alternative is literally inconceivable.31 There is no ontological 
alternative, in part because the persons who may inhabit this alternative 
are never “seen.”32 Here, disparate impact theory is designed to make the 
invisible person visible, to uncover alternatives, to demonstrate that the 
                                                     
 25. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2522 (“Recognition of disparate-impact liability . . . permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious 
prejudices and disguised animus . . . .”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2013); Siegel, supra note 12, at 657. 
 26. See, e.g., Cheryl Staats, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2014, 2014 KIRWAN 
INST. FOR STUDY RACE & ETHNICITY, available at http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf (compiling studies). But cf. Gregory Mitchell & 
Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 
(2006) (criticizing some of the methods and conclusions of implicit bias studies). 
 27. See Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in 
the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 67 (2010) (raising concerns 
about implicit bias as a source of liability). 
 28. Professor Siegel refers to this as “structural discrimination.” Siegel, supra note 12, at 657. 
 29. Cf.  EDWARD P. JONES, THE KNOWN WORLD (2003) (providing a fictional account of black 
slaveholders in a fictitious Virginia county). 
 30. See Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Ra-
cial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1808 (2000) (“A racial institution is any understanding of 
race that has come to be so widely shared within a community that it operates as an unexamined 
cognitive resource for understanding one’s self, others, and the-way-the-world-is.”); see also Darrell 
A.H. Miller, Racial Cartels and the Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 100 KY. L.J. 23, 33 
(2012). 
 31. López, supra note 30, at 1781–83. 
 32. Some preliminary experimental data suggests that when White females are primed for 
interpersonal goals (romantic partner, friend, neighbor, coworker) and then given a visual awareness 
task, they were more likely to overlook African-American males than White males on a diminishing 
scale based on the personalness of the goal. By contrast, when there is no priming, African-
Americans were marginally more likely to be seen, the hypothesis being that they become salient as 
a threat. Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi et al., The Invisible Man: Interpersonal Goals Moderate Inatten-
tional Blindness to African Americans, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 33 (2013). 
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frames in which choice take place are not the only frames available to 
show that there are, in fact, other worlds.33 
Empathy, or rather its deficit, helps explain the persistence of all 
three types of disparate impact. But for my purposes, empathy is espe-
cially pertinent to the problem of the ignorant and the institutional dis-
criminator. Empathy has become a significant topic of scholarly investi-
gation among sociologists, behavioral economists, cognitive scientists, 
and (more recently) legal scholars. Although researchers define empathy 
in various ways,34 I follow those who define empathy to mean “perspec-
tive taking”: the cognitive ability to understand another person’s emo-
tions and motivations.35 This type of empathy can, but need not, lead to 
sympathy or altruism.36 For my purposes, empathy is epistemic but not 
necessarily relational.37 
For the ignorant discriminator, the decisionmaker may not accurate-
ly assess the disutility suffered by the person discriminated against. In a 
provocative set of experiments, researchers have demonstrated that peo-
ple perceive the pain of a person of another race differently than a person 
of their own race.38 Further, Blacks are perceived as experiencing less 
pain than Whites by all persons.39 However, the reasons for this percep-
tion are still being investigated.40 One theory is that “intergroup empathy 
gaps” are the product of perceptions about whether the person belongs 
within or without the perceiver’s racial group. A potentially confounding 
theory is that perception of Black pain is reduced because Blacks are as-
sumed to be of a lesser economic status.41 Because they are of a lesser 
status, perceivers assume Black lives to be harder overall and, as such, 
                                                     
 33. López, supra note 30, at 1781–83. 
 34. See Frederique de Vignemont & Tania Singer, The Empathetic Brain: How, When and 
Why?, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 435, 435 (2006). 
 35. See id. (identifying one concept of empathy as “perspective-taking”). 
 36. See id.; see also Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and 
Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 4 tbl.2 (2002); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empa-
thy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1009 (2010). 
 37. Lauren Wispé, The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a Concept, 
a Word Is Needed, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 314, 318 (1986) (distinguishing between 
empathy, which is “knowing,” and sympathy, which is “relating”). 
 38. See, e.g., Alessio Avenanti, Angela Sirigu & Salvatore M. Aglioti, Racial Bias Reduces 
Empathetic Sensorimotor Resonance with Other-Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018 (2010); 
Luis Sebastian Contreras-Huerta et al., Racial Bias in Neural Empathic Responses to Pain, PLOS 
ONE, Dec. 23, 2013, at 1; Matteo Forgiarini, Marcello Gallucci & Angelo Maravita, Racism and the 
Empathy for Pain on Our Skin, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. (May 23, 2011), jour-
nal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00108/full; Sophie Trawalter, Kelly M. Hoffman & 
Adam Waytz, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Others’ Pain, PLOS ONE, Nov. 14, 2012, at 1. 
 39. See Trawalter, Hoffman & Waytz, supra note 38. 
 40. See id.; see also Sophie Trawalter & Kelly M. Hoffman, Got Pain? Racial Bias in Percep-
tions of Pain, 9 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 146 (2015). 
 41. Trawalter, Hoffman & Waytz, supra note 38, at 5. 
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assume Blacks to experience pain to a lesser degree than persons of 
higher economic status, who have easier lives and tend to be White.42 
For the institutional discriminator, the lack of empathy may simply 
make the person blind to alternative ways to construct choice. The prob-
lem could be based on lock-in effects that arise from the costs of switch-
ing, as Daria Roithmayr has extensively studied.43 But the problem could 
also be that the cost-benefit analysis never comes into play because no 
one ever investigates, or even imagines, the predicates for such an analy-
sis. For example, a generation of women received treatment for heart 
disease based on studies conducted primarily on men.44 
I do not mean to suggest that disparate impact can be entirely elim-
inated. Disparate impact is inevitable because people must make deci-
sions: firefighters must be hired, police must be dispatched, traffic lights 
must be installed, and tax dollars must be collected and spent.45 No indi-
vidual or group has the cognitive capacity to calculate every utility func-
tion for every person generated by every decision.46 A choice to hold 
class at eight in the morning is going to disadvantage those who need to 
sleep until ten. But disparate impact as a legal doctrine and as a norma-
tive claim does not concern the impacts on everyone: disparate impact 
concerns the effects on those who are consistently under regarded, who 
have less access to mechanisms to ensure their concerns are heard, and 
for whom the Constitution has been amended to address that systematic 
lack of concern.47 How the history of slavery, Reconstruction, and Thir-
teenth Amendment fits into this picture is the subject of Part II. 
                                                     
 42. Id. at 5, 7. 
 43. See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 231–36 
(2004). See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK 
IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014). 
 44. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Lack of Studies on Women 
Limits Usefulness of Research on Coronary Heart Disease (July 10, 2003), available at 
http://archive.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2003/chdwmpr.htm (“[M]any of the tests and therapies that are 
used to treat women for [coronary heart disease] are based on studies conducted predominantly in 
men.”); see also 151 CONG. REC. S2273 (2005) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (noting that physicians 
assumed that aspirin’s heart-protective effects on men applied equally to women). 
 45. Cf. Roger Clegg, Silver Linings Playbook: “Disparate Impact” and the Fair Housing Act, 
in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2014–2015, at 165, 174 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2015) (“There is 
probably no selection or sorting criterion that doesn’t have a disparate impact on some group or 
subgroup.”). 
 46. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211, 214–15 (1995) (discussing limits on human ability to make decisions that lead to optimal 
outcomes). 
 47. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1177 (6th ed. 
2014). 
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II. SLAVERY AND EMPATHY DEFICITS: EMANCIPATION, EMIGRATION, 
AND INVISIBLE HANDS 
Making the Black body disappear once its service was no longer 
required or compelled was a fantasy of antebellum politics—both North 
and South.48 For example, Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, dreamed of gradual emancipation followed by colonization of 
the former slaves “to such place as the circumstances of the time should 
render most proper.”49 Many southern states required manumitted former 
slaves to leave the state or face fine or reenslavement.50 Abraham Lin-
coln admitted that his “first impulse” to address slavery in America was 
to “free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia.”51 In 1862, a draft bill 
from the Congress’s Select Committee on Emancipation and Coloniza-
tion planned gradual emancipation in the Border States; it proposed 
twenty million dollars “for the purpose of deporting, colonizing, and set-
tling the slaves so emancipated . . . in some state, territory, or dominion 
beyond the limits of the United States.”52 An antebellum opponent of 
slavery, Orestes Brownson, believed that colonization was the best future 
for the emancipated because the “mutually instinctive aversion to inter-
marriage” between Blacks and Whites meant there was no hope of form-
ing a multiracial post-war society.53 This was because “marriage is the 
basis of the family, and the family is the basis of general society; when 
therefore the different races or varieties are separated by too broad an 
interval for the family union, it is clear that they cannot form one and the 
same society.”54 In other words, because it was impossible for Whites to 
                                                     
 48. See GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 86 (2006) (observing that Whites from 
both the North and the South “expected the freed slaves to disappear within a generation or two”). 
Frederick Douglass dramatized this sentiment in his autobiography. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 
NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: AN AMERICAN SLAVE 47–48 (1849) (describing 
his grandmother, dying alone and without family, abandoned in a shack, once she had ceased to be 
of any further economic use). 
 49. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 144 (1832). 
 50. Virginia, Florida, North Carolina, Maryland, Tennessee, Texas, and Kentucky had such 
regulations. See Jenny Bourne Wahl, Legal Constraints on Slave Masters: The Problem of Social 
Cost, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 14 n.46 (1997); see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael 
Higginbotham, “Yearning to Breathe Free”: Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty 
in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1228 (1993). 
 51. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN 51 (Andrew Delblanco ed., Pen-
guin Books 2009) (1992). 
 52. Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 
765, 849 (2011) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 37-576 § 3, at 32 (1862)). 
 53. ORESTES AUGUSTUS BROWNSON, Emancipation and Colonization, in 3 BROWNSON’S 
QUARTERLY REVIEW 220, 233 (1862). 
 54. See id.; see also Rierson, supra note 52, at 843.   
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see Blacks as marriage partners or family members, it was impossible to 
see them as fellow citizens.55 
The Thirteenth Amendment opted for a “hard shove” of immediate 
abolition rather than a “nudge” of gradual emancipation.56 But the dream 
that former slaves would simply vanish lingered. There were some ideas 
of a post-war colonization movement,57 but as it became clear that no 
widespread and voluntary Black emigration was likely to materialize, 
White desire to have the newly emancipated Black body disappear took 
subtler forms. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill 
and the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, confident that the invisible hand of the 
marketplace could resolve the “Negro problem.”58 Market forces would 
effortlessly readjust the relationship between labor and capital, Blacks 
and Whites.59 This notion that there was an ineluctable, unconscious, and 
normal relationship between labor and capital and between the races was 
the animating theory of the Waite Court’s later Reconstruction cases.60 
By the time the federal troops pulled out of the South as part of the 
Compromise of 1877, the bile of a mid-century southern malcontent 
probably expressed the feelings of many White Americans: “Would to 
God, they (meaning the negroes) were back in Africa, hell, or some other 
sea-port town, anywhere but here.”61 
III. BADGES OF SLAVERY, EMPATHY DEFICITS, AND THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist with-
in the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction[,]” and that 
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.”62 The Court has not held the Thirteenth Amendment itself prohibits 
                                                     
 55. See David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 230, 236 (2015) (discussing the view-
points on intermarriage and citizenship of Brownson and his contemporaries); cf. Brown-Iannuzzi et 
al., supra note 32, at 33–37 (discussing different perceptions based on whether a person considers a 
member of another race a potential marriageable partner). 
 56. See Rierson, supra 52, at 862 (using these descriptors). 
 57. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
6 (Francis Parkman Prize ed., History Book Club 2005) (1988). 
 58. See Miller, supra note 30, at 38. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Be-
longs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 393 
(2014). 
 61. H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 328 (1866). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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disparate impacts.63 Neither has the Court extended disparate impact the-
ories to the Amendment’s most salient enforcement legislation, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.64 However, the Court has left open the possibility 
that the Thirteenth Amendment, alone or through congressional legisla-
tion under Section Two, could reach some kinds of disparate impacts.65 
The Court has stated that congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment is not limited to preventing or punishing only involuntary 
servitude, but is aimed at preventing the reemergence of an institution—
American slavery.66 Congress has the power, therefore, to enact legisla-
tion aimed not only at slavery as a labor practice, but also as a racialized 
institution composed of “badges,” “incidents,” and “relics.”67 
A “badge” or “incident” of slavery, as George Rutherglen has ar-
gued, can be understood as a technical term, referring to the specific le-
gal and political disabilities of slavery.68 But, as Rutherglen notes, the 
term “badge” can also be a metonym for the kinds of attitudes or behav-
iors that were constitutive of slavery as an American institution.69 These 
attitudes and behaviors were race-specific in a way that is impossible to 
ignore. In this sense, the kind of systematic empathy deficit, the invisibil-
ity of Black people once their instrumentality is estimated and liquidated, 
is a consequence of slavery. If that understanding of “badge” is correct, 
then the ability to legislate under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment may support race-conscious disparate impact remedies that tend to 
confound conventional Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment 
rationales.70 Even in the absence of such a legislative exercise, the effort 
to minimize disparate impact as a relic of slavery can serve as a moral 
compass with which to orient other types of policy prescriptions.71 
                                                     
 63. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 101 (1981). 
 64. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). 
 65. Id. at 389 n.17 (“We need not decide whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself reaches 
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The relationship between Thirteenth Amendment enforcement and 
other express and implicit constitutional values is a tense one.72 Recog-
nizing the capacity of Congress to reach disparate impacts as a badge or 
relic of slavery does not completely resolve the conflict. However, think-
ing of empathy deficits as a product of the racialized institution of slav-
ery supplies a new conceptual angle to the problem. Slavery was an insti-
tution marked by neglect as much as by intent, and policies designed to 
prevent its reemergence should be able to reflect that truth.73 
CONCLUSION 
In Charles Black’s estimation, the southern caste system sprung 
from “that most hideous of errors, that prima materia of tragedy, the 
failure to recognize kinship.”74 Failure to recognize—or even to see—
minorities in America—minorities as America—is a habit of mind that 
persists one hundred and fifty years after emancipation. It is a habit the 
Court should let us break. 
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